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Abstract 
I quantify the welfare gains from introducing history dependent income tax in an incomplete 
markets overlapping generations framework where individuals face uninsurable idiosyncratic 
shocks. I assume that the income tax paid is a function of a geometrical weighted average of past 
incomes, and solve for the optimal weights. I find that the two main factors that determine the 
nature of history dependence are the degree to which the government discounts future 
generations and the degree of mean reversion in the productivity process. The welfare gains from 
history dependence are large, about 1.76 percent of consumption. I decompose the total effect 
into an efficiency effect that increases labour supply, and an insurance effect that reduces volatility 
of consumption and find that, quantitatively, the insurance effect dominates the efficiency effect. 
The optimal tax increases consumption insurance by trading higher tax progressivity with respect 
to past incomes for a reduced tax progressivity with respect to the current income.  
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1 Introduction
Recent research on dynamic optimal taxation, starting with Golosov et al. (2003), has
shown one robust feature of optimal tax systems in economies with idiosyncratic shocks:
they should in general depend on the full history of individual’s incomes.1 Yet, our
understanding of how specifically the income taxes should depend on past incomes is
limited. How important is one’s income last year relative to one’s income ten years ago?
What are the welfare gains from history dependence, and where do the welfare gains
come from? What parameters of the environment are key for determining the gains from
history dependence? How much is lost by restricting history dependence to a limited
number of periods? Robust answers to questions like these have not yet been provided.
This paper answers those questions in an analytically tractable framework simi-
lar to the one used by Heathcote et al. (2014). Individuals face uninsurable random
walk productivity shocks, and the government uses a nonlinear income tax of the form
Tt(yt) = yt − λy¯1−τt , where yt is a current income, and y¯t is an aggregator of past in-
comes: y¯t = ∏tj=0(yt−j)
θj . The tax is thus history dependent, with the relative importance
of past incomes embodied in the coefficients {θj}. The framework is flexible enough to
incorporate history independent income taxes, income taxes that depend on a finite
number of lags, and income taxes that depend on the full history of incomes. It also
retains tractability that characterizes this environment with history independent taxes.
Why is history dependence useful? In principal, history dependence could either
help reduce distortions of labor supply (incentive effect), or provide a more efficient con-
sumption insurance (insurance effect). One can write the tax system in a way that the
incentive effect is determined only by the parameter τ, called the progressivity wedge:
higher τ drives a wedge between wage and marginal rate of substitution, and reduces
labor supply. The extent of consumption insurance is, on the other hand, driven by both
the progressivity wedge τ and the history dependence coefficients θ. I show that the
coefficients θ depend only on a small number of underlying parameters. Notably, they
are independent of the progressivity parameter τ.
I show that the character of history dependence depends manly on two things: how
the government discounts future generations, and how mean reverting the underlying
1Exceptions to this rule involve some economies where all uncertainty is resolved in the initial period
and, to some extent, economies with IID shocks, where history dependence can be replaced by dependence
on assets (Albanesi and Sleet (2006)).
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productivity process is. Government’s discounting of future generations drives a wedge
between how the government effectively discounts future periods, and how the agent
discount future periods. When the government is more patient than the agents, it can
exploit the differences in discounting to shift consumption insurance across ages, again
without changing labor supply incentives. In particular, since the government is more
patient, it prefers to shift consumption insurance towards later ages, and away from
earlier ages. This is achieved by choosing a tax system that is regressive with respect
to the current income, and mildly progressive with respect to the past incomes. The
second factor is the degree of mean reversion in the labor productivity process. Mean
reversion means that there are gains from spreading the impact of a productivity shock
over many periods. This is done by making the tax system more progressive with respect
to the current income, and regressive with respect to past incomes. That way, current
consumption responds to the current shock positively but very little, while at the same
time responding positively but very little to past shocks. This increases consumption
insurance but, since individuals take into account the response of future consumption to
current income, their incentives to work are not reduced. Both factors thus give a very
different policy prescription when it comes to the nature of history dependence, and I
show conditions under which they cancel each other out, and history independence is
optimal.
While the history dependence parameters θ are chosen independently of the progres-
sivity wedge τ, the reverse is not true. The progressivity wedge is chosen to balance the
distortions of labor supply and, again, a reduction in consumption dispersion. Since
history dependence already reduces consumption dispersion, the government responds
by reducing the progressivity wedge τ relative to the case with history independent tax-
ation. Thus, history dependence in the end reduces both the progressivity of the tax
system, and the dispersion of consumption.
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy where the productivity shocks follow a
random walk, thus leaving the differences in discounting as the key factor that deter-
mines the importance of history dependence. I follow Heathcote et al. (2014) who show
that the U.S. tax system can be well approximated by a (history independent) tax system
with a progressivity parameter τ = 0.161. I show that the welfare gains from history
dependence are large: they are about 1.76 percent in consumption equivalents. Quanti-
tatively, almost all of the benefits of history dependent income taxation, about 92 percent
of it, come from the fact that it reduces the cross-sectional variance of log consumption,
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which is reduced by about a third. The remaining 8 percent comes from efficiency gains,
i.e. from the reduction of the progressivity wedge τ. In the optimum, τ is increased
modestly from 0.161 to 234. In contrast, if the tax system is history independent, then
the current U.S. tax system should be much more progressive, since the parameter τ
should be increased to 0.296. I also compute welfare gains from a limited history de-
pendence. There are large welfare gains even from relatively short history dependence:
Taxes that depend only on the past 10 annual incomes generate about 50 percent of the
potential welfare gains from an unlimited history dependence, while taxes that depend
on the past 16 incomes generate about 75 percent of the potential welfare gains.
Finally, I compare the welfare gains from a history dependent taxes to taxes that de-
pend only on age. Age dependent taxation achieves a similar reduction of consumption
dispersion, by increasing tax progressivity with age. This, however, introduces unneces-
sary variations in the progressivity wedge over time - something that history dependent
taxation is able to evade. As a result, the welfare gains from age dependent taxation,
while still large, are only about 48 percent of the overall gains.
The paper connects two strands of the existing literature. On one hand, it uses in-
sights from the recent dynamic public finance literature (Golosov et al. (2003), Kocher-
lakota (2005)), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Farhi and Werning
(2005), Werning (2007) Golosov et al. (2016) and Farhi and Werning (2012) and many
others) that shows that history dependence in income taxation is optimal. On the other
hand, in order to achieve tractability, the paper does not use a standard mechanism de-
sign approach to gain insights about the optimal policies. Instead, it follows the tractable
analytical framework pioneered by Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and further ex-
tended by Heathcote et al. (2014) and Heathcote et al. (2016), who include insurable
transitory shocks as well as labor supply decision.2 As in Benabou (2002), who studies
educational decisions in a related framework, I assume that the agents cannot borrow
and save to self-insure to gain tractability. Each of the last three papers assumes that in-
come tax function is a power function but, importantly, none of them allows for history
dependence. My framework includes history dependence, but retains enough tractabil-
ity to quantitatively study problems with multiple sources of heterogeneity, with over-
lapping generations, and in general equilibrium, none of which has been a focus of the
dynamic optimal taxation literature.
2Other functional forms used in thre literature can be found in (Conesa and Krueger (2006), Kinder-
mann and Krueger (2017), and others.
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2 Setup
The model is a ”perpetual youth” overlapping generation model. There is a measure
one of agents in the population. Each period, a fraction 1− δ of each generation dies
and is replaced by a new generation of size 1− δ as well. The measure of age-j agents is
thus (1− δ)δj. The utility function takes the form
w0 = E0
∞
∑
j=0
(1− βδ)(βδ)j
(
ln cj − φ1+ η h
1+η
j
)
, 0 ≤ β < 1. (1)
The parameter η ≥ 0 is inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, while φ deter-
mines the relative weight of disutility from working. The parameter η is identical for
all agents, while φ is a random variable, drawn once at age zero, with a cumulative dis-
tribution function Fφ. At each age, agents received labor productivity zj ∈ Z ≡ (0,∞).
Their productivity, together with hours worked hj determines the output yj = zjhj. Log
productivity zj follows an autoregressive process,
ln zj = ρ ln zj−1 +ωj,
where ωj is an iid random variable that has a cumulative distribution function Fω with
density fω, and ρ is autocorrelation of productivity shocks. The distribution is normal-
ized so that E(eω) = 1. Both the initial ”seed” z−1 and the initial shock ω0 are equal to
zero, implying that the initial productivity z0 is equal to one for everyone.3
Market Structure. I assume that there is no insurance against the permanent shocks
z. That includes self-insurance: the agents are not allowed to save to hedge against
the permanent shocks. This is a strong assumption, but it allows me to get closed-
form solution for the equilibrium allocations even for the tax systems that are history
dependent. Benabou (2002) makes the same assumption for the same reasons. I will
revisit this assumption later.
3The model can be easily generalized to allow for initial heterogeneity in productivity, without chang-
ing the main results.
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2.1 A Tax with History Dependence
The government taxes individual incomes by using an income tax that is history depen-
dent: the tax paid depends on individual’s history of earnings. The tax function has the
following functional form: an individual of age j with a history of incomes y0, y1, . . . , yj
pays taxes
Tj(y0, y1, . . . , yj) = yj − λj
(
y¯j
)1−τ , (2)
where y¯t is a weighted geometric average of current and past incomes,
y¯j =
j
∏
k=0
(yj−k)θk .
The progressivity wedge τ determines the overall progressivity of the tax system. The
history dependence parameters θ = (θ0, θ1, . . .) represent how the current tax paid depends
on income realizations in the past. Specifically, the parameter θk represents the weight
on income of lag k. A history independent tax is a special case with θ0 = 1 and θk = 0
otherwise. The tax function Tj depends on age directly through the level tax parameters
λj. An age specific level tax parameter allows the government to choose a trend in
average consumption independently of the remaining parameters. On the other hand,
both the history dependence parameters and the progressivity wedge are time and age
invariant, and that is one of the key restrictions in the paper.4 The parameters τ and
θ jointly determine the progressivity of the tax system. The average income-weighted
marginal tax with respect to the current income is 1− (1− τ)θ0, and so if θ0 is sufficiently
large, the tax system may be regressive with respect to the current income. The average
income-weighted marginal tax with respect to the income of lag k is −(1− τ)θk. If θk
is positive then the tax system is regressive with respect to past incomes, while if θk is
negative, the tax system is progressive.
Incentive keeping constraint. The tax function leaves one degree of freedom in the tax
parameters τ and θ. This allows us to simplify the problem by choosing a convenient
normalization. The first-order conditions yield the following expression for equilibrium
4Taxes paid also depends indirectly on age, because the length of individual histories depends on age.
However, if one assumes that incomes before being born are all equal to one, then the tax function can be
written as a time and age invariant function of an infinite history of incomes.
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hours worked:
ln h∗j =
1
1+ η
[
ln(1− τ)
∞
∑
k=0
(βδ)kθk − ln φ
]
. (3)
This suggests that a useful way to normalize the tax system is to impose the following
incentive keeping constraint:
∞
∑
k=0
(βδ)kθk = 1. (4)
This normalization implies that labor supply decisions of the agents are independent of
the history dependent coefficients θ, and depend only on the progressivity wedge τ. The
logic is as follows. Each individual, when choosing hours worked, takes into account
the incentive effects of all future taxes paid from current income. If the normalization
(4) holds, reducing marginal tax rates in the current period by reducing θ0 by one unit
must be exactly offset by an increase in the marginal tax rate in some period k by (βδ)−k
units. Since future taxes paid are effectively discounted at rate βδ, this trade-off does not
change work incentives. The incentive keeping constraint then implies that the incentives
to work are determined exclusively by the progressivity wedge τ, and are independent
of the parameters θ.
2.2 Allocations
Equation (5) and the incentive keeping constraint (4) imply that the optimal hours
worked are
ln h∗j =
1
1+ η
[ln(1− τ)− ln φ] . (5)
Hours worked are independent of the productivity shocks, because with log utility the
income and substitution effects cancel out. Heterogeneity in the preference parameter
φ is the only source of heterogeneity in hours worked in this model. Due to the incen-
tive keeping constraint (4), hours worked are independent of the history dependence
parameters θ, and tax policies only affect hours worked by the progressivity wedge τ.
Individual consumption can be obtained by using the budget constraint cj = λj
(
y¯j
)1−τ,
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and by substituting in the equilibrium hours worked:
ln cj = lnλj +
1− τ
1+ η
j
∑
k=0
θk [ln(1− τ)− ln φ] + (1− τ)
j
∑
k=0
θk ln zj−k. (6)
Consumption depends on all past productivities only because taxes paid depend on
past incomes. The key in determining the nature of history dependence are, of course,
the history dependence parameters θ. Note that consumption in general can move pre-
dictably with age, first because λ depends on age and, second, because the expected
value of the weighted average of past incomes y¯j is changing with age. Specifically, if
∑
j
k=0 θk is decreasing in j, then the expected consumption will be increasing with age.
3 Partial Equilibrium
I will start by analyzing a government’s problem in a partial equilibrium, where prices
are exogenous, and there is only one generation, born at time zero. The government
maximizes the following social welfare function:
W ≡ (1− αδ)
∞
∑
j=0
(αδ)jE0(uj). (7)
where uj is period utility, and α ∈ [β, 1) is the government’s discount factor. The gov-
ernment is therefore discounting future at a rate that may be different from the agent’s
discount rate. This assumption can be taken as a primitive assumption about the social
welfare function, as in Farhi and Werning (2005). In that case, the social welfare function
is non utilitarian. But, as we shall see later, the assumption can be also justified in an
overlapping generation setting, where the government has a utilitarian social welfare
function for each generation, but cares more about future generations than about the
current generation (in which case α > β). In any case, the additional flexibility of al-
lowing for a different discount factor for the government will prove useful for clarifying
what matters for history dependence.
The tax system has aggregate cost equal to the present value of aggregate consump-
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tion minus the present value of aggregate earnings:
P ≡ (1− qδ)
∞
∑
j=0
(qδ)jE0(cj − yj), (8)
where the interest rate q ∈ (0, 1) is exogenously given. The government chooses the tax
parameters λ, τ and θ to maximize the social welfare function (7) subject to the resource
constraint P = 0 and the incentive keeping constraint (4), taking the policy functions (5)
and (6) as given.5
Substituting the policy functions (5) and (6) into the social welfare function (7) and
the resource constraint and optimizing with respect to the level parameters λ yields the
following optimality condition: the parameters λ should be chosen in a way that the
aggregate consumption is growing at a rate equal to α/q:
E0(cj) = E0(c0)
(
α
q
)j
. (9)
Aggregate consumption is thus constant if α = q, and the government’s discount factor
is exactly offset by the rate of return. Note that individual discount factor β does not
play any role in determining the trend in aggregate consumption because an individual
cannot shift resources over time on his own. This is reminiscent of Calvo and Obstfeld
(1988) finding that aggregate consumption in the Pareto optimum of an overlapping
generations economy is determined by the social planner’s rate of time preference, and
individual’s time preference does not play any role. It is shown in Appendix A that if
the parameters λ are set optimally, the aggregate welfare can be written as a function of
τ and θ only, and is given by
W(τ, θ) = u¯(τ) + ln
(
1− αδ
1− qδ
)
+
αδ
1− αδ (ln α− ln q)
−
∞
∑
j=0
(αδ)j
[
αδ ln Bω
(
(1− τ)∑jk=0 ρj−kθk
)
+ (1− αδ) ln Bφ
(
− (1− τ)∑jk=0
θk
1+ η
)]
+ (1− τ)
(
αδ
1− αδρEω−
1
1+ η
E ln φ
) ∞
∑
j=0
(αδ)k θj, (10)
5It is easy to allow for exogenous government spending G, in which case the resource constraint
becomes P + G = 0.
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where Bω(a) = E(eaω) and Bφ(a) = E(ea ln φ) are moments of the underlying distribu-
tions, and u(τ) = 11+η [ln(1− τ)− 1+ τ] is the representative agent’s period utility.6 The
government’s problem is now to maximize the objective function (10) by choosing the
tax parameters τ and θ subject to the incentive keeping constraint (4).
3.1 Lognormal Distribution
The government’s problem will be greatly simplified if both the productivity shocks and
the preference shocks are lognormally distributed. To that end, assume that
ω ∼ N
(
−σ
2
ω
2
, σ2ω
)
ln φ ∼ N
(
(1+ η)
σ2φ
2
, (1+ η)2σ2φ
)
.
The mean and variance of the taste shock distribution are normalized so as to simplify
algebra later. Then Bω(a) = e−
1
2 a(1−a)σ2ω and Bφ(a) = e
1
2 (1+η)a(1+(1+η)a)σ
2
φ and the govern-
ment’s objective function (10) reduces to
W(τ, θ) = u(τ)− 1
2
(1− τ)2
[
Pα,ρ(θ)κσ2ω + Pα,1(θ)σ
2
φ
]
, (11)
where κ = αδ1−αδρ2 is a parameter that scales the productivity shocks, and Pα,ρ(θ) is a
quadratic function of only of the history dependence parameters, given by
Pα,ρ(θ) =
∞
∑
j=0
(αδ)j
(
θ2j + 2∑
j−1
k=0 ρ
j−kθkθj
)
.
The functional form of the social welfare function (11) shows that the optimal choice of
the history dependence parameters is determined by minimizing the weighted average
of Pα,ρ, which represents the contribution of the productivity shocks, and Pα,1, which rep-
resents the contribution of the preference shocks. The weights are given by the relative
variances of both shocks, with the productivity shock being scaled by κ to correct for the
fact that the shocks are persistent and discounted. The welfare function (11) also shows
that the choice of the history dependence parameters θ is independent of the choice of
6In principle, there is an additional constant term reflecting the aggregate production gains from the
dispersion in φ. This term is zero due to the normalization of the taste shock distribution.
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the progressivity wedge τ, although the reverse is clearly not true. This simplifies the
problem, both technically, and substantially. Furthermore, it is easy to see that, under
history independence, the value of Pα,ρ equals one for all values of α and ρ. The wel-
fare gains from a history dependent tax policy are determined by the reduction of the
weighted average of Pα,ρ and Pα,1. The size of the welfare gains is also proportional to
the square of the progressivity wedge τ.
Turning to the progressivity wedge τ, an increase in τ weighs the costs in terms of
labor supply distortions against the benefits of reduction in the dispersion of consump-
tion (see 11). Since history dependence reduces consumption dispersion by reducing P
below one, the benefits from higher τ are reduced, and the balance shifts in favor of
lower labor supply distortion:
Proposition 1. The optimal progressivity wedge τ∗ decreases when history dependence is al-
lowed.
Before solving for the optimum history dependence coefficients, it is worth consid-
ering a simple example that sheds light on why, and under what conditions, is history
dependence in income taxation welfare improving.
3.2 Optimal History Dependence
The social welfare function shows that the optimal history dependence parameters are a
solution to the following simple minimization problem:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
{
Pα,ρ(θ)κσ2ω + Pα,1(θ)σ
2
φ
}
s.t. (4).
This minimization problem makes it clear that the optimal history dependence coef-
ficients depend only on the discount factors β and α, on the survival rate δ, on the
autocorrelation off shocks ρ, and on the ratio of variances σ2ω/σ2φ . Notably, they are
independent of the progressivity wedge τ, and the level of the two shock variances. The
first-order condition in θk is
k
∑
l=0
(
1+ κρk−l
)
θl +
∞
∑
l=k+1
(αδ)l−k
(
1+ κρl−k
)
θl =
(
β
α
)k
ζ,
11
where ζ is an (appropriately normalized) Lagrange multiplier on (4). This is a difference
equation that, together with (4), can be solved for the coefficients θ, and for the Lagrange
multiplier ζ.
In general, the difference equation above has to be solved numerically. In special
cases, there is a closed form solution. We will first investigate two examples with a closed
form solution. The examples will highlight two of the main sources for welfare gains:
differences in discounting between government and the agent, and mean reversion in
the productivity process.
3.3 Example 1: The role of differences in discounting
If ρ = 1, it is easy to see that the above minimization problem is equivalent to the min-
imization of Pα,1 subject to (4). It also follows, that the history dependence coefficients
are independent of both σ2ω and σ2φ, and that the welfare now depends only on the total
variance of shocks κσ2ω + σ2φ.
Why History Dependence? To understand how differences in discounting shape his-
tory dependence, consider the following perturbation to a history independent tax with
θ0 = 1 and θ1 = 0. Suppose that θ0 increases by dθ0 > 0. An increase in θ0 has two
effects. First, it makes the tax system less progressive at all ages, and directly changes
welfare by ψ × dθ0 < 0. Second, a change in θ0 requires an adjustment in the tax pa-
rameters λ0 and λ1 to keep mean consumption unchanged, and the government budget
constraint holds. This changes welfare by −(ψ+ σ2φ)× dθ0 < 0. Taken together, the level
effects cancel each other out and an increase in θ0 on net decreases welfare by σ2φ × dθ0.
The effect is negative, because an increase in θ0 reduces consumption insurance at every
age.
An increase in θ0 is, however, compensated by a decrease in θ1. The incentive keeping
constraint implies that θ1 must change by dθ1 = −(βδ)−1dθ0 < 0. The effects now have
the opposite sign: a decrease in θ1 changes utility directly by αδψ× dθ0 > 0 and indirectly
through adjustment in λ1 by αδ(ψ+ σ2φ)× dθ1, with a positive net effect −αδσ2φ× dθ1 > 0.
The positive net effect now comes from an increased consumption insurance for agents
with age one and more; that’s why its size is αδ times smaller than what a perturbation
12
in θ0 produces. The overall change in welfare is
dW = −σ2φ × dθ0 − δασ2φ × dθ1 =
(
α
β
− 1
)
σ2φ × dθ0.
If α > β then the total effect is positive, and it is optimal to increase θ0 and decrease
θ1. To understand this result, note that, by changing history dependence, the government
changes consumption insurance across ages without changing labor supply incentives
(as long as the incentive keeping constraint holds). The net effect depends on two things:
at what rate can consumption insurance be traded across ages, and how the government
values consumption insurance at different ages. An increase in θ0 decreases consumption
insurance at all ages, while a decrease in θ1 increases consumption insurance in the
future (at ages one and on). The trade-off is determined by the individual discount
factor βδ. Since βδ < 1, an increase in θ0 allows for a proportionally larger reduction
in θ1, and the above perturbation decreases consumption insurance at age zero while
increasing consumption insurance in the future. Now, how important this trade-off is for
the government is determined by the government’s discount factor αδ. If the government
is more patient than the agent, an increase in future consumption insurance dominates,
and the trade-off is worthwhile.
If β = α, then a perturbation in θ0 or θ1 each has nonzero first-order effect on welfare,
and the trade-off between consumption insurance across ages still exists. But the effects
exactly cancel each other in the social welfare function, and a history independent tax
policy is an optimal one. If, on the other hand, σφ = 0 then there is no trade-off. any
change in θ is exactly compensated by changes in λ0 and λ1, and any perturbation in θ0
or θ1 has zero welfare effect. It is again optimal to have history independent tax because
it smooths consumption for the representative agent.
Main result. I will now show that an analogous intuition extends to the more general
case with infinite history dependence. It also carries over to the case when there is
idiosyncratic uncertainty about productivity shocks, rather than preference shocks.
Proposition 2. If ρ = 1 then the welfare maximizing coefficients θ∗ are
θ∗0 =
1− β2δα
1− βδ , θ
∗
k = −
(
1− β
α
)(
β
α
)k−1
θ∗0 , k > 0,
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and the value of Pα,1(θ∗) is
Pα,1(θ∗) =
(1− δα)
(
1− β2δα
)
(1− βδ)2 .
Proposition 2 offers a very simple and practical characterization of the optimal pro-
gressivity coefficients. It immediately implies that the optimal coefficient on the current
income is positive and greater than one, while the coefficients on past incomes are neg-
ative. Relatively to a history independent tax, the tax system thus becomes less pro-
gressive with respect to the current income and more progressive with respect to past
incomes. The results, and the intuition, are both analogous to the example above.
The coefficients on past incomes are geometrically increasing, and converge to zero at
a rate equal to the ratio of both discount factors, β/α. They will typically be significantly
smaller than the coefficient on the current income: for example, the coefficient on the
previous period income is only 1− β/α the coefficient on the current income. Even for
α = 1, it will be only around 2-4 percent of what the coefficient on the current income is.
Reinterpreting History Dependent Tax. The history dependent tax function (2) can,
for the optimum coefficients θ∗, be reinterpreted in two useful ways. First, by rearranging
the terms, one can write the geometric average of past incomes as
Tt = yt −
 t∏
k=0
(
yt−k
yt−k−1
)( β
α
)k(1−τ)θ0 .
That is one the optimal tax can be written as a function of a weighted average of past
income growth rates, as opposed to a weighted average of the levels of income. The
result follows intuitively from the fact that the productivity shocks are essentially shocks
to the growth rate of productivity, as opposed to shocks to the level of productivity.
Alternatively, and perhaps more usefully from a practical perspective, one can define an
average past income as xt by xt = ∏tk=0 y
(1−β/α)(β/α)k
t−k . Then the tax paid is
Tt = yt − λ
(
yt
xt−1
)(1−τ)θ0
.
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The past income average is simply updated recursively according to xt = y
1−β/α
t x
β/α
t−1 ,
and every agent starts with x0 = 1. This formulation is useful since one needs only one
state variable, the average of past incomes xt−1, to characterize the current tax function.
Limited History Dependence What if the government is only allowed to use income
history of length K? Next proposition shows the closed form solution to the truncated
case:
Proposition 3. Assume that θk = 0 for k > K, for some K > 0. Then the welfare maximizing
coefficients are
θ∗0 =
1− β2δα
1− βδ
1−
(
1− βα
)2
δα
(1− βδ)2
(
β2δ
α
)K
−1
θ∗k = −
(
1− β
α
)(
β
α
)k−1
θ∗0 , k = 1, . . . , K− 1
θ∗K = −
1
1− βδ
(
1− β
α
)(
β
α
)K−1
θ∗0 .
and the value of Pα,ρ(θ∗) is
Pα,ρ(θ∗) =
(1− δα)
(
1− β2δα
)
(1− βδ)2
1−
(
1− βα
)2
δα
(1− βδ)2
(
β2δ
α
)K
−1
.
The coefficients in the full history dependence problem are just a limiting case with K
going to infinity. On the other hand, there is a substantial difference between a tax that
includes only current and past income (K = 1), and a tax under full history dependence.
For example, when τ = 0.2, α = 1, β = 0.96 and δ = 0.97 then 1− (1− τ)θ∗0 = −0.75.
The average marginal income tax rate with respect to the current income is thus -75
percent. In contrast, the current income is taxed only at a rate of -23 percent with full
history dependence. There is also a substantial difference between a tax with no history
dependence (K = 0) and a tax that includes only current and past income. However,
including one period lag reduces variance of consumption by only about 5 percent,
significantly less than under full history dependence. Although the value of Pα,ρ(θ∗) is
decreasing in K, one needs more than one lag to capture most of the potential benefits
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from history dependence.
3.4 Example 2: The role of mean reversion in productivity
Differences in discounting between the government and the agent are one source of
welfare gains from history dependent income taxation. A second source of welfare
gains comes from the fact that productivity shocks are mean reverting. To investigate
this source of welfare gains, assume now that α = β, so that there is no difference in
discounting, but allow for any ρ ∈ [0, 1]. If, in addition, there is no heterogeneity in the
preference parameter φ, the problem again has a closed form solution. We get
Proposition 4. If α = β and σ2φ = 0 then the welfare maximizing coefficients θ
∗ are
θ∗0 =
1− βδ
1− βδρ , θ
∗
k = (1− ρ)θ0, k > 0,
and the value of Pβ,ρ(θ∗) is
Pβ,ρ(θ∗) =
(1− βδ)(1− βδρ2)
(1− βδρ)2 .
The current coefficient is always smaller than one, while the coefficients on past
incomes are positive. That is, the tax on past incomes is negative, and the optimal
tax system increases progressivity with respect to the current income, while decreasing
progressivity with respect to the past incomes. Interestingly, the coefficients on past
incomes are constant, and do not change with the length of the history.
The autocorrelation of shocks is critical in determining the gains from history depen-
dence, with lower ρ delivering higher welfare gains. If ρ = 1 and the shocks follow a
random walk, then there are no gains from history dependence:7
Proposition 5. If α = β and ρ = 1 then history independent tax system is optimal.
At the other extreme, if ρ = 0 and the shocks are iid, then θ0 = θk = 1− βδ for all
k > 0, and all the shocks have the same weight. It is therefore optimal to simply take an
unweighted geometric average of all the past incomes.
To illustrate the welfare gains, I calibrate the stochastic process for productivity and
preference shocks according to Kaplan (2012). The autocorrelation of shocks is ρ = 0.958,
7The proposition applies even if σ2φ > 0.
16
the variance of productivity innovations is σ2ω = 0.017, and the variance of preference
shocks is σ2φ = 0.065. We also set β = 0.96, δ = 1 (no mortality shock) and η = 2. If
one starts with the best available history independent tax system, the welfare gain is
about 0.66 % in consumption equivalents. Almost all of the welfare gains come from
the reduction of consumption variance. Only a small part comes from the reduction in
the progressivity wedge τ which decreases from 0.299 under the history independent tax
system to 0.277. The welfare gains are somewhat larger if one starts with the current U.S.
tax code, which is represented by a history independent tax function with τ = 0.161. The
welfare gains from history dependence only are 0.89 %, with additional welfare gains
coming from increasing the progressivity wedge to 0.277.
Limited History Dependence If the income history is exogenously restricted to be of
length K, the solution has to be modified. Next Proposition shows the solution:
Proposition 6. Assume that θk = 0 for k > K, for some K > 0. If α = β and σ2φ = 0 then the
welfare maximizing coefficients are
θ∗0 =
1− βδ
1− βδρ
[
1− (βδ)K+1
(
1− ρ
1− βδρ
)2]−1
,
θ∗k = (1− ρ)θ0, k = 1, . . . , K− 1
θ∗K =
1− ρ
1− βδρθ0.
and the value of Pβ,ρ(θ∗) is
Pβ,ρ(θ∗) =
(1− βδ)(1− βδρ2)
(1− βδρ)2
[
1− (βδ)K+1
(
1− ρ
1− βδρ
)2]−1
.
The initial history dependence coefficient decreases with the length of permissible
history K. Interestingly, the ration of the coefficient on the past income to the coefficient
on the current income is still 1− ρ. The exception is the coefficient on the last permissible
income θK, that now increases to (imperfectly) pick up for the missing coefficients on
higher incomes. The coefficients in the full history dependence problem are again a
limit when K goes to infinity.
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare gains from limited history dependence, and the cor-
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Figure 1: Welfare gains from partial history dependence in pct consumption equivalents
(left panel) and the progressivity wedge (right panel).
responding progressivity wedge. The welfare gains from a short permissible income
history are rather small: including 5 past incomes lead to a welfare gain of about 0.18%,
less than a third of the potential welfare gain under full history dependence. Includ-
ing 15 past incomes produces a welfare gain of 0.4%, a little less than two thirds of the
potential welfare gains. A relatively long history is thus needed to capture most of the
welfare gains.
3.5 When is history independence optimal?
Previous section has identified one case when it is optimal to have history independence:
when the shocks follow a random walk, and there is no difference in discounting. It is,
however, optimal to have history independent taxation in one additional ”knife-edge”
case: when the pressure for more progressivity with respect to past incomes coming
from the faxct that α > β exactly cancels out with the pressure for less progressivity
with respect to past income coming from the fact that ρ < 1. This will happen under the
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following conditions:
Proposition 7. If ρ = β, α = 1 and σ2φ = 0 then history independent tax system is optimal.
Previous results show that there are two opposing forces in play. First, if α > β,
it is optimal to shift consumption insurance forward. If ρ < 1, it is optimal to shift it
backward. Under the conditions of the proposition, both forces cancel out, and history
independence is optimal.
3.6 Age Independent Tax Function
Up until now, the government was allowed to use a tax function that depended directly
on age through the parameters λj. What happens if the government does not have
the opportunity to choose age specific λ? I derive a full solution in Appendix A. I
show several results there. First, the inability to transfer resources across age through
variations in λ means that the parameters τ and θ will, at least in part, be chosen so as
to substitute for age varying λ. The optimal history dependence parameters θ now also
depend on the intertemporal price of consumption q. The exact form of the objective
function can be found in the Appendix. Here I only mention that an exercise analogous
to the perturbation exercise in section 3.3 yields that a perturbation of θ0 = 1 by dθ0 and
a corresponding perturbation of θ1 = 0 by dθ1 = −(βδ)−1dθ0 will yield a welfare change
dW =
(
q
β
− 1+ α− q
2β
)
σ2φ × dθ0.
Hence, it will be welfare improving if, first, q > β and, second, if α > q. The first
requirement is that the government is more patient than the agent, but it is now the
intertemporal price of consumption, rather than the government discount factor, that is
being compared to the agent’s discount factor α. The second condition requires that the
government is patient relatively to it’s the discount factor. We know from (9) that, in that
case, the government wants to implement an increasing pattern of consumption over
time. It cannot do it directly now. However, a progressive history dependent tax acts as
an imperfect substitute for that, because the progressivity parameters accumulate and
increase consumption as individual ages.
It is easy to see that if α = q then the condition collapses to the one in section 3.2.
In fact, I show more than that. Whenever α = q and the distribution is lognormal, the
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welfare function (11) is approximately correct, and so are the optimal welfare coefficients.
More specifically, a first-order approximation to the time invariant parameter λ yields
the welfare function identical to (11). As it turns out, for empirically relevant parameter
values, namely standard deviations of the idiosyncratic shocks, the approximation is
very close to the unrestricted solution. In those cases, an age independent tax function
is a very good approximation of the optimal one.
4 General Equilibrium
I will now analyze a problem for a full overlapping generation economy, and show how
it can be malled to the partial equilibrium framework. The social welfare function ag-
gregates lifetime utilities of generations that are not yet born, and the remaining lifetime
utilities of generations that are currently alive. The government weights the welfare of
a generation born in period t by pit for some Pareto weight parameter pi ∈ (0, 1). This
includes generations not yet born, but also generations that are currently alive, i.e. born
before time t = 0. Their Pareto weights are then whose weight is then greater than one.
The social welfare function is then
W ≡ (pi − βδ)(1− pi)
pi(1− βδ)
[
∞
∑
t=0
pitE0(wt) +
−1
∑
t=−∞
pitE0(wˆt)
]
, (12)
where E0(wt) is the expected lifetime utility of someone who will be born at time t ≥ 0,
E0(wt) = (1− βδ)
∞
∑
j=0
(βδ)jE0(uj) t ≥ 0, (13)
and E0(wˆt) is the remaining lifetime utility of someone who is currently alive and was
born at time t < 0. Importantly, the remaining lifetime utility is discounted back to their
birthdate:
E0(wˆt) = (1− βδ)
∞
∑
j=−t
(βδ)jE0(uj) t < 0. (14)
Discounting everyone’s period utilities back to their birthdates and discounting every
generation’s lifetime utilities at rate pi ensures that everyone is treated symmetrically,
and implies that the resulting social welfare function is time consistent (Calvo and Ob-
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stfeld (1988)).
The expected period utilities E0(uj) depend on age, but not explicitly on time, or
one’s cohort. That is because the tax function is not explicitly dependent on time (al-
though it can depend on age or individual history). Then all individuals of age j have
the same utility uj. Substituting the expressions (13) and (14) into the welfare function
(12) yields that the welfare is a weighted average of period utilities, with future utilities
discounted at a rate determined jointly by the discount factor, the survival rate, and the
Pareto parameter:
W =
(
1− βδ
pi
) ∞
∑
j=0
(
βδ
pi
)j
E0(uj). (15)
The general equilibrium case can thus be mapped into the partial equilibrium model
with α = β/pi. If the benchmark case when the government discounts at the same rate
as the agents, pi = β and the welfare is simply the average of period utilities weighted
by the survival rate δ.8
Similar calculations can be made regarding the resource costs. The annualized present
value of the aggregate costs is the sum of the discounted expected cost of the generations
not yet born, and the expected costs of the currently living generations for the reminder
of their life:
P ≡ (1− q)(1− δ)
1− qδ
[
∞
∑
t=0
qtE0(pt) +
−∞
∑
t=−1
E0( pˆt)
]
,
where E0(pt) is the expected present value of costs of a generation born in period t
discounted back to the present value at rate q,
E0(pt) = (1− qδ)
∞
∑
j=0
(qδ)jE0(cj − yj) t ≥ 0, (16)
and E0( pˆt) for t < 0 is the expected present value of of costs for the currently living
generation for the remainder of their lifetimes,
E0( pˆt) = (1− qδ)δ−t
∞
∑
j=0
(qδ)jE0(cj−t − yj−t) t < 0. (17)
8One interpretation is that, conditional on being alive, all period utilities are weighted equally.
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If the period cost again do not depend on time, then the aggregate cost are independent
of the intertemporal price of consumption, and are simply equal to the period costs,
where the cost of older generations is discounted at rate δ because of a decreasing gen-
eration size:
P = (1− δ)
∞
∑
j=0
δjE0(cj − yj). (18)
The general equilibrium case can again be mapped into the partial equilibrium model
with q = 1. Overall, the relationship between the results for the partial equilibrium
economy and for the general equilibrium economy are summarized as follows:
Remark. The solution to the general equilibrium model is identical to the solution to the
partial equilibrium model with α = β/pi and q = 1.
4.1 A Case with pi = β
I will now study a benchmark case, where the government weights the generations at
the discount rate pi = β.9 The welfare function (15) is now
W(τ, θ) = u(τ)− 1
2
(1− τ)2P1,1(θ)(σ2z + σ2φ), (19)
where σ2z =
δ
1−δσ
2
ω is a cross-sectional variance of productivity shocks. One implication
of the fact that welfare can be represented by (19) is that the preference shocks ln φ and
the productivity shocks z enter symmetrically; in fact, only the sum of both variances
matters for aggregate welfare. This is intuitive, since both shocks affect the agent’s
ability to produce output similarly, and each innovation in the agent’s productivity ω
is permanent, just like the preference shock. Since the cross-sectional variance of log
consumption is
Var (ln c) = (1− τ)2P1,1(σ2φ + σ2z ),
the welfare function in the benchmark case is simply a welfare from a representative
agent’s allocation u¯(τ), minus one half of the cross-sectional variance of log consumption
Var (ln c). The optimal history dependence parameters can be characterized as follows:
9Note that, since α = q = 1, an age independent tax function will be approximately correct in this case,
as discussed previously.
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Figure 2: The value of the history dependence parameter θ0 (left panel) and the reduction in the cross-
sectional variance of consumption Pβ/pi,1(θ∗) (right panel) for various values of β and δ.
Proposition 8. The coefficients θ∗ maximize social welfare if and only they minimize the cross-
sectional variance of log consumption subject to the incentive keeping constraint (4).
The optimal history dependence parameters are given in Proposition 6, with α set
equal to one. The coefficients on past incomes are thus geometrically increasing at rate
β. The left panel of Figure 2 plots the value of the coefficient θ0 for a range of values of
β and for three values of δ. The value of θ0 is significantly greater than one. In fact, for
plausible value of the progressivity wedge τ, the value of ”nominal” progressivity with
respect to the current income 1− (1− τ)θ0 is negative. Since the marginal tax rate with
respect to the past incomes is positive, the tax system ”subsidizes” current income, and
then taxes it for the rest of the agent’s life.
The value of P(θ∗; 1) converges to one as β approaches unity (more precisely, when β
converges to α = 1), and so for extremely low discount rates the reduction in the cross-
sectional variance of consumption will not be very high. For more plausible values the
reduction can be significant: for β around 0.96 the variance of log consumption will be
reduced by about a third, as the right panel of Figure 2 illustrates.
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Consumption Dynamics. The optimal income tax changes dramatically the dynamics
of individual consumption. While consumption follows a random walk when taxes are
history independent, it is a moving average process under the history dependent tax
system:
ln cj = ln c¯j − 1− τ1+ η β
j ln φ+ (1− τ)θ0
j−1
∑
k=0
βkωj−k,
where ln c¯j is a deterministic component of consumption. The left panel of Figure 3
shows a typical response to a unit increase in the innovation to the permanent compo-
nent ω for a given progressivity wedge. Under history independent taxation, the effect
on consumption is permanent. Under full history dependence, consumption responds
more in the short run, but then the effect of the shocks disappears. Clearly, in order to
maintain the same progressivity wedge, there needs to be a trade-off, and consumption
cannot always respond less under history dependence. But the government can convert
the long-run consumption risk (under history independence) into a short-run risk. Fig-
ure 3 also shows the consumption impulse response function and the variance of log
consumption under partial history dependence for K = 5. The result combines features
of both extremes: Not all long-run risk is eliminated, although it is significantly reduced.
The variance of log consumption initially increases faster than under history indepen-
dence, and then grows without bounds, although at a smaller rate than under history
independence.
This has important implications for the nature of consumption dispersion. The right
panel of Figure 3 shows the variance of log consumption by age. Under history inde-
pendent taxation, the variance of individual consumption Var (ln cj) grows over time
linearly without bounds.10 Under the optimal history dependent scheme, on the other
hand, the variance of log consumption is bounded away from infinity,
Var (ln cj) = (1− τ)2θ20
1− β2j
1− β2 σ
2
ω, (20)
and converges over time to a finite limit θ20/(1− β2)(1− τ)2σ2ω. Since θ0 > 1, the optimal
policy increases the immediate impact of the shock and, in the short run, the variance
of log consumption is higher than under history independence. But then the shock’s
impact decays at a rate equal to the discount rate.
10What keeps the cross-sectional consumption from growing without bounds is that individuals die at
rate δ.
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Figure 3: Response of log consumption to a unit increase in ω (left panel) and variance of log consump-
tion by age (right panel). Blue lines represent taxes dependent only on current income. Red lines represent
taxes with full history dependence. Green lines represent taxes with limited history dependence (K = 5).
Welfare gains. What are the welfare gains from optimal history dependent tax? Pre-
vious discussion shows that history dependence increases welfare in two ways: first,
it reduces consumption dispersion for any given progressivity wedge τ and, second, it
reduces the progressivity wedge itself. The contribution of each of those components
will be examined quantitatively later. The welfare gain from the reduction of consump-
tion dispersion is, however, easy to characterize. Let Wˆ0(τ) be welfare under a history
dependent tax with progressivity wedge τ, and Wˆ(τ) be welfare under a history depen-
dent tax where the coefficients θ are chosen optimally, but the progressivity wedge is
still τ. Using the fact that with log utility the welfare gains are approximately equal to
the difference between both values of welfare, we get
Wˆ(τ)− Wˆ0(τ) = 12(1− τ)
2 [1− P1,1(θ∗)] (σ2φ + σ2z ).
If τ = τ∗0 , the optimal progressivity wedge under the history independent tax system,
then Wˆ − Wˆ0 represents a lower bound on the welfare gain from history dependence
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since there is an additional welfare gain from replacing τ∗0 by τ∗. If τ equal to a value
that approximate U.S. tax code, then Wˆ − Wˆ0 is the lower bound on the welfare gains
from reforming the current U.S. tax code. The latter calculation can in fact be done very
easily, since (1− τUS)2(σ2φ+ σ2z ) is the measured variance of consumption under the U.S.
tax code and is approximately 0.14. Thus, the welfare gains are at least 0.07 [1− P(θ∗)].
If the variance of consumption is reduced by a third, then the welfare gains are at least
2.3 percent in consumption equivalents. As we shall see, this is a pretty accurate estimate
of the welfare gains.
4.2 Parameterization
The model is parameterized to match U.S. experience. The parameterization is similar
to Heathcote et al. (2016), although differences are necessary given that the model of this
paper does not include the education sector. The U.S. tax code is history independent
and its progressivity parameter is estimated by Heathcote et al. (2016) to be τ = 0.161.
I set η = 2, implying a Frisch elasticity of 0.5, β = 0.957 to match an interest rate of 4
percent in the calibrated economy, and pi = β. The survival rate is set to δ = 0.971, to
match an expected working life of 35 years.
Under the U.S. tax code, the measured cross-sectional variance of consumption is
given by
V̂ar (ln c) = (1− τ)2
(
σ2z + σ
2
φ
)
+ ξc, (21)
where ξc is the measurement error in consumption. To set the cross-sectional variance
of the permanent productivity shock σ2z and the variance of the taste shock σ2φ, I use
equation (21) as a restriction on feasible parameter values. Based on the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics and Consumer Expenditure Survey data from 2000 to 2006, Heath-
cote et al. (2016) report empirical moments V̂ar (ln c) = 0.18 and its measurement error
ξc = 0.04. Equation (21) then provides a restriction on plausible values of σ2z and σ2φ.
11
Heathcote et al. (2016) find σ2ω = 0.003 in their baseline calculations. Other estimates
reported in the literature are larger: Heathcote et al. (2010) find σ2ω = 0.00625 by using
a longer time period 1967-2005, although in a framework that does not include taste
11There are corresponding expressions for the variance of hours worked and earnings. Unlike equation
(21) they potentially depend on the variance of insurable productivity shocks (which are not modeled in
this paper). For this reason I do not use them to parameterize the model.
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shocks.12 I will set the benchmark values to σ2ω = 0.005, but I will consider other values
satisfying (21) as well. The remaining benchmark values are σ2z = 0.167 and σ2φ = 0.039.
All the benchmark parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
β δ η σ2ω σ
2
ε σ
2
φ
0.957 0.971 2.000 0.005 0.234 0.039
Figure 4 plots the aggregate welfare as a function of the progressivity wedge τ for
both the tax system that depends only on the current income (blue line), and for a tax
system with optimally chosen full history dependence (red line). The US tax system,
being history independent, is represented by a point on the blue line. Since the utility
is logarithmic, the welfare gains in consumption equivalents are well approximated by
the differences in the welfare. The welfare maximizing progressivity wedge in a tax
system based only on current income τHI is 0.296, a significant increase in progressivity
relative to the current U.S. value of 0.161. Introduction of history dependence decreases
the progressivity wedge τFH substantially, down to 0.234, although still more than the
current U.S. value.
The welfare gains from replacing the best tax system based only on the current in-
come by the optimal fully history dependent tax system are large: they are equal to 1.77
percent of consumption equivalents. The welfare gain from replacing the current U.S.
tax system with the optimal fully history dependent tax system is naturally even larger,
2.48 percent of consumption. In contrast, the welfare gain from replacing the current
U.S. tax system with the best tax system based on the current income only is only 0.72
percent of consumption.
To understand the source of the welfare gains, recall than one can decompose the
optimal tax reform into two parts: a choice of the history dependence parameters for
any given progressivity wedge τ, and a choice of the welfare maximizing progressivity
wedge τ. The first part is represented in Figure 4 by a vertical move from the blue line
to the red line, and the second part is represented by a move along the red line. Starting
with the best history independent tax system, the figure shows that most of the gains
12Older estimates are provided by Heathcote et al. (2005) who estimate σ2ω = 0.0095 and Storesletten
et al. (2004) who estimate σ2ω = 0.0161, both by using data up to 1996.
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Figure 4: Welfare gains from history dependence
are realized from the introduction of history dependence: 1.63 percent of consumption,
which represents is 92.1 percent of all gains. The remaining 7.9 percent of the gains, that
is 0.14 percent of consumption equivalents, is then realized by reducing the progressivity
wedge from τHI to τFH.
Introducing a limited history dependence reduces the welfare gains from the optimal
tax reform. The left panel of Figure 5 plots the welfare gains as a function of the length
of history dependence, ranging from 0 to K = 30. About 16 percent of the overall
welfare gains can be obtained when the tax is allowed to depend only on the current
and previous income. To reach 50 percent of the overall welfare gains, one needs to
include 10 past incomes; including 16 past incomes allows the government to capture
75 percent of the gains. Given the size of the overall welfare gains, conditioning income
taxes on even a few past incomes has large benefits, although longer lags are needed to
capture the majority of benefits.
The progressivity wedge τ gradually decreases as the length of history dependence
increases, as the right panel of Figure 5 shows. The average marginal tax rate out of
the current income, on the other hand, is not monotone. It equals the progressivity
28
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
History length K
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
W
K
−
W
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
History length K
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
τ K
τUS
Figure 5: Welfare gains from limited history dependence in percent consumption equiv-
alents (left panel) and the progressivity wedge (right panel).
wedge of 29.5% when K = 0, then increases to 57.9% for K = 3 as the preference shock
considerations dominate, then decreases before increasing again.
5 Age Dependent Progressivity
Consider now a tax function that is history independent, but its remaining parameters
are allowed to depend on age, Tj(y) = y − λjy1−τj . The parameters τj are again the
progressivity wedges, and are now age dependent. The government’s problem is to
choose the sequences (λj, τj) subject to the resource constraint.
The details of the government’s problem are relegated to Appendix C, but the nature
of the optimum is easy to describe. The parameters λj are again chosen to equate the
average consumption over time. The progressivity wedge is increasing with age, because
the variance of consumption increases with age. As a result, the government sacrifices
more progressivity in favor of higher redistribution. The progressivity wedge is thus
very low at the beginning, and converges to one as age goes to infinity.
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Both history dependent and age dependent taxation share the same objective: to
reduce the variance of consumption. Age dependent taxation, however, comes with
important negative side-effects: age varying progressivity wedge introduces determin-
istic variations in labor supply that are not motivated by efficiency considerations. If
τ¯ = (1− δ)∑∞j=0 δjτj is the average progressivity wedge, then the aggregate welfare is
W = u¯(τ¯)− 1
2
Var (ln c)− ∆,
where u¯(τ¯) is the representative agent’s utility from the average progressivity wedge τ¯,
γε(τ¯) is the gain from insurable shocks given the average tax, and ∆ is the welfare loss
from age varying progressivity wedge,
∆ = − log
[
(1− δ)∑∞t=0 δj
(
1− τj
1− τ¯
) 1
1+η
]
.
One can then decompose the effects of age dependent taxes into a reduction of vari-
ance of log consumption, change in the representative agent’s utility plus gains from
insurable transitory shocks, and distortions of the deterministic profile ∆ (see Table 2).
The variance of log consumption is reduced by 14.3 percent to 0.084. This is compa-
rable to the reduction in the variance of consumption from history dependent income
taxation (20.8 percent), and produces a welfare gain of about 0.707 percent of consump-
tion. The gain in the representative agent’s utility u¯(τ¯) is also significant, about 0.536
percent of consumption, due to the fact that τ¯ is lower than the optimal tax under the
age-independent system. However, age variations in the progressivity wedge produce
a cost of about 0.468 percent of consumption, approximately offsetting the gain in the
representative agent’s utility. Overall, the gain from age dependent taxation is about
0.775 percent of consumption.
Relative to the history dependent tax system, the age dependent system is somewhat
less efficient in increasing the representative agent’s utility and in reducing variance
of consumption. The main difference is, however, that age dependent taxes produce
unwelcome variations in the progressivity wedge, while history dependent tax system
does not. As a result, the welfare gain from history dependent tax system is 1.765
percent, and age dependency can only recover about 43.9 percent of the gains.
Interestingly, if one shuts down the preference shocks, age dependent tax system can
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capture 57.6 percent of the overall welfare gains. Preference shocks introduce additional
source of variation in consumption, and limit the gains from age varying progressivity
wedge, especially from setting it very low initially. The gains from time varying progres-
sivity wedge is thus limited. On the other hand, if one shuts down productivity shocks
then the gains from age dependent taxation are exactly zero, because the cross-sectional
variance of consumption does not naturally increase with age. These findings suggests
that the relative attractiveness of age dependent taxation may be sensitive to the number
of underlying shocks.
Table 2: Contributions to Welfare Gains
History Dependence Age Dependence
Representative agent’s utility 0.741 0.536
Variance of log consumption 1.025 0.707
Variation of progressivity wedge − −0.468
Welfare gains 1.765 0.775
Note: Welfare gains relative to U.S. tax system. Contribution of RA’s utility is u¯(τ∗) −
u¯(τUS). Contribution of variance of log consumption is − 12 [Var (ln c)−Var (ln cUS)]. Con-
tribution of the variation in the progressivity wedge is −∆.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the nature of history dependent taxation, and the welfare gains from
it, in a parametric framework that is easy to analyze. There are two main factors that
determine the importance of history dependent income taxation. The first one is mean
reversion of productivity shocks. The second one are differences in discounting between
government and an individual, in particularly if the government discounts future utili-
ties at a lower rate, which comes naturally in an overlapping generations economy. Both
factors are significant, but each of them produces a different nature of history depen-
dence. If productivity shocks are mean reverting, the tax system should be more pro-
gressive with respect to the current income and regressive with respect to past incomes,
while the opposite is true if the government discounts at a lower rate.
I show that in a general equilibrium overlapping generations economy where the
productivity shocks follow a random walk (so that the effect of mean reversion is absent),
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the history dependence parameters should be chosen with a simple goal in mind: to
minimize the cross-sectional variance of log-consumption while keeping the efficiency
wedge constant. I show that this is achieved by discounting past incomes at a rate equal
to the discount rate. The welfare gains from history dependent taxation itself are large,
about 1.76 percent of consumption. About 50 percent of the gains is captured by having
taxes depend on past 10 incomes. Taxes that depend on age, but not on individual
history, are able to capture about 44 percent of the potential gains.
The results of this paper were derived under one strong assumption: that the agents
are not allowed to borrow and save. This assumption is not restrictive under history in-
dependent taxation when consumption follows a random walk. However, under history
dependent taxes consumption regresses back to its mean, and individuals have incen-
tives to borrow or save to further smooth their consumption. History dependence thus
elicits a demand for individual borrowing and saving. The welfare implications are not
clear: higher insurance may be beneficial given that the tax function taxes a particular
parametric form that is not optimal, but saving will reduce incentives to work. The as-
sumption of no saving can also be relaxed by assuming that the government chooses a
savings tax in a way to prevent individuals from savings. The properties of such a tax
function are easy to derive. Such a savings tax may not be optimal, but this means that
the welfare gains in this paper are form a lower bound on the overall welfare gains that
can be achieved by choosing the savings tax optimally.
The question that future research needs to answer is whether the principles found
in this paper are a good and reliable guide in more complex environments. Mirrlees
economies, where there are no restrictions on the shape of the tax function, or economies
where agents can borrow and save, are especially interesting environments to answer
these questions.
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Appendix A: Deriving the Welfare Function
The government chooses the tax parameters {λj}, τ and {θj} to maximize the social
welfare function (7) subject to P = 0 and (4), taking (5) and (6) as given. The expected
values of period utility and period costs are
E0(uj) = lnλj +
1− τ
1+ η
[ln(1− τ)−E ln φ]
j
∑
k=0
θk + (1− τ)
j
∑
k=0
1− ρj−k
1− ρ θkEω−
1− τ
1+ η
E0(cj) = λjBφ
[
−(1− τ)∑jk=0
θk
1+ η
]
∏j−1k=0 Bω
[
(1− τ)∑kl=0 ρk−lθl
]
e
1−τ
1+η ln(1−τ)∑
j
k=0 θk
E0(zjh) = (1− τ)
1
1+η ,
where the term (1 − ρj−k)/(1 − ρ) equals j − k when ρ = 1. Substitute E0(uj) into
(7), E0(cj) and E0(zjh) into (8), and let ζ be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource
constraint. The first-order conditions in λj are
1
λj
= ζ
1− qδ
1− αδ
( q
α
)j
Bφ
[
−∑jk=0
1− τ
1+ η
θk
]
∏j−1k=0 Bω
[
(1− τ)∑kl=0 ρk−lθl
]
e
1−τ
1+η ln(1−τ)∑
j
k=0 θk
One can then rewrite the aggregate consumption as
E0(cj) =
1
ζ
1− αδ
1− qδ
(
α
q
)j
,
which implies (9). The resource constraint then yields ζ = (1− τ)− 11+η . After eliminating
λ and ζ from the objective function, one can write it as (10).
Lognormal distribution. With productivity shocks being lognormally distributed,
ln Bωj = −∑jk=0
[
(1− τ)ρj−kθk − (1− τ)2ρ2(j−k)θ2k − 2(1− τ)2∑k−1l=0 ρ2j−k−lθlθk
] σ2ω
2
ln Bφj = −∑jk=0
[
(1− τ)θk − (1− τ)2θ2k − 2(1− τ)2∑k−1l=0 θlθk
] σ2φ
2
.
Simplifying and cancelling terms yields (11).
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Appendix B: Welfare Function when λ is age independent.
Assume that α = q. By substitutingE0(uj) into (7) and using (1− αδ)∑∞j=0(αδ)j ∑jk=0 θk =
∑∞j=0(αδ)
jθj and that (1− αδ)∑∞j=0(αδ)j ∑jk=0(j− k)θk = αδ/(1− αδ)∑∞j=0(αδ)jθj, one can
write the welfare function as
W = lnλ− 1− τ
1+ η
+ (1− τ)
[
ln(1− τ)
1+ η
− 1
1+ η
E ln φ+
αδ
1− αδEω
] ∞
∑
k=0
(αδ)k θk.
The (age independent) tax parameter λ is obtained from the resource constraint P = 0.
Using E0(cj) and E0(zjh) yields
λ∗(τ, θ) = (1− τ)
1
1+η
(1− δq) ∞∑
j=0
(δq)jBφ
[
−∑jk=0 1−τ1+η θk
]
∏
j−1
k=0 Bω
[
(1− τ)∑kl=0 θl
]
e
1−τ
1+η ln(1−τ)∑
j
k=0 θk
.
Lognormal distribution. With productivity shocks being lognormally distributed, the
function λ∗ is approximated as follows:
Lemma 9. If the shocks are lognormally distributed then
lnλ∗(τ, θ) ≈∑∞k=0(δq)k
(
(1− τ)θk − (1− τ)2θ2k − 2(1− τ)2∑k−1l=0 θlθk
) δq
1−δqσ
2
ω + σ
2
φ
2
−∑∞k=0(δq)k(1− τ)
ln(1− τ)
1+ η
θk +
ln(1− τ)
1+ η
.
Proof. Let Γ = (1 − τ)− 11+ηλ∗. I will approximate the function Γ. Moreover, since qδ
always appears together, I will set q = 1 throughout, to reduce notation. Then the
function Γ can be compactly written as
Γ(τ, θ)−1 = (1− δ)∑∞j=0 δjB¯jBφj∏
j−1
k=0 Bωk,
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where
Bωj ≡ Bω
[
(1− τ)∑jk=0 θk
]
= e−∑
j
k=0[(1−τ)θk−(1−τ)2θ2k−2(1−τ)2 ∑k−1l=0 θlθk]
σ2ω
2 = e−
1
2 mj(1−mj)σ2ω
Bφj ≡ Bφ
[
−1− τ
1+ η∑
j
k=0 θk
]
= e−∑
j
k=0[(1−τ)θk−(1−τ)2θ2k−2(1−τ)2 ∑k−1l=0 θlθk]
σ2φ
2 = e−∑
j
k=0 nk
σ2φ
2
B¯j ≡ e∑
j
k=0
1−τ
1+η ln(1−τ)θk = e∑
j
k=0 ok ,
and
mk = (1− τ)∑kl=0 θl
nk = (1− τ)θk − (1− τ)2θ2k − 2(1− τ)mk−1θk
ok =
1− τ
1+ η
ln(1− τ)θk.
Note, for future reference, that the relationship between m and n can be written as
mk −m2k = mk−1 −m2k−1 + nk, and that m0 −m20 = n0.
I first truncate the history at an arbitrary length K, approximate the resulting function
Γ, and then take the limit as K goes to infinity. Assume that θk = 0 for k > K for some
K > 0. Truncation implies that B¯j = B¯K, Bφj = BφK and Bωj = BωK for j > K. Then
Γ(τ, θ)−1 = (1− δ)
[
∑Kj=0 δjB¯jBφj∏
j−1
k=0 Bωk +
δK+1
1− δBωK B¯KBφK∏
K
k=0 Bωk
]
= (1− δ)eo0− 12 n0σ2φ
[
∑Kj=0 δj∏
j−1
k=0 e
ok+1− 12 nk+1σ2φBωk +
δK+1
1− δBωK ∏
K
k=0 e
ok+1− 12 nk+1σ2φBωk
]
.
This can be expressed recursively by means of the following relationship:
Γ(τ, θ)−1 = eo0−
1
2 n0σ
2
φ A0
Ak = 1− δ+ δeok+1−
1
2 nk+1σ
2
φ− 12 mk(1−mk)σ2ω Ak+1, k = 0, . . . , K− 1
AK = (1− δ)
(
1+ δ
BωK
1− δBωK
)
=
1
1
1−δ − δ1−δ e−
1
2 mK(1−mK)σ2ω
.
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The terminal term AK can be approximated as
AK ≈ 1
1+ δ1−δmK(1−mK)12σ2ω
≈ e− δ1−δ(mK−m2K) 12σ2ω ,
The first approximation uses the fact that e−a ≈ 1− a for small a, while the second one
uses the same fact in the form ln(1+ a) ≈ a for small a. Now suppose that
Ak ≈ e−
δ
1−δ(mk−m2k+∑K−kl=1 δlnk+l)
σ2ω
2 −∑K−kl=1 δlnk+l
σ2φ
2 +∑
K−k
l=1 δ
lok+l . (22)
Clearly, AK takes this form. Write
Ak−1 = 1−δ+ δeok−nk
1
2σ
2
φ−mk−1(1−mk−1) 12σ2ω Ak
= 1−δ+ δe−(mk−1−m2k−1) 12σ2ω−nk(1−nk) 12σ2φ+ok Ak
= 1−δ+ δe−[mk−1−m2k−1+ δ1−δ(mk−m2k+∑K−kl=1 δlnk+l)] 12σ2ω−∑K−kl=0 δlnk+l 12σ2φ+∑K−kl=0 δlok+l
= 1−δ+ δe−[ 11−δ (mk−1−m2k−1)+ δ1−δnk+ δ1−δ ∑K−kl=1 δlnk+l] 12σ2ω−∑K−kl=0 δlnk+l 12σ2φ+∑K−kl=0 δlok+l
≈ e− δ1−δ(mk−1−m2k−1+∑K−k+1l=1 δlnk−1+l) 12σ2ω−∑K−k+1l=1 δlnk−1+l 12σ2φ+∑K−k+1l=1 δlok−1+l .
Thus, Ak−1 takes the form in (22) as well. The third equality uses the fact that mk−m2k =
mk−1 −m2k−1 + nk, and the last line uses the same approximations as in the initial step.
Continuing by induction and noting that m0−m20 = n0 and that Γ(τ, θ)−1 = eo0−
1
2 n0σ
2
φ A0,
one obtains that
ln Γ(τ, θ) ≈ −∑Kk=0 δk
(
ok − nk
σ2φ
2
− δ
1− δnk
σ2ω
2
)
.
Letting K go to infinity, replacing δ with qδ and and substituting in for nk and ok
yields the desired result.
Substituting λ∗ into the welfare functionW yields
W = 1
1+ η
[ln (1− τ)− (1− τ)]− (1− τ)2
∞
∑
k=0
(δq)k
(
θ2k + 2
k−1
∑
l=0
θlθk
)(
δq
1− δq
σ2ω
2
+
σ2φ
2
)
.
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Accuracy of the Approximation
The approximate solution, as characterized by the welfare function (19) and by Propo-
sition 2 is only as good as the approximation that underlies it. It is easy to see that the
approximation abstracts from some potentially important factors. Most prominently, it
suppresses the importance of consumption smoothing. The welfare function (19) implies
that the history dependence coefficients are independent of the variance parameters, and
thus hold even in case of σ2φ = σ
2
z = 0. But that is clearly incorrect in the true solution.
In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks it is optimal to have constant consumption over
time, which is acheved by a history independent tax system. Thus, we know that θ0 = 1
and θk = 0 for k > 0 is optimal, and the approximate solution is far away from the true
one. But how good is the approximation for realistic parameter values? Figure 6 shows
the approximate history dependence coefficients for history length K = 15, and com-
pares them to the true history dependence coefficients. In computing the true history
dependence parameters I take a benchmark value for the overall variance of shocks to be
σ2 = σ2φ + σ
2
z = 0.198 and , and the benchmark optimal progressivity wedge τ = 0.238
and show the results for various alternative values of the overall variance of shocks σˆ2.13
If the standard deviation of shocks is zero, σˆ = 0, then the true coefficients are
zero, and the approximate solution is obviously inaccurate. This is also true when the
standard deviation is only 10 percent of the benchmark standard deviation of shocks, and
the consumption smoothing factor still dominates. However, if the standard deviation is
one half of the benchmark deviation then the true solution is already quite close to the
approximate solution. If the standard deviation is 90 percent of the benchmark value or
equal to the benchmark value then the approximate solution is almost identical to the
true solution. For realistic values of the
13To simplify exposition I only plot coefficients θk for k = 1, . . . K − 1 and do not show θ0 and θK that
have different magnitudes.
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Figure 6: Accuracy of the Approximate Solution for K = 15, τ = 0.238 and σ2 = σ2φ + σ2z = 0.198.
Appendix C: Age dependent progressivity
Suppose that the tax function parameters depend on age, Tj(y) = y− λjy1−τj and that
pi = β. Then the optimal policy functions (with only permanent shocks) are
ln hj(z) =
1
1+ η
(
ln(1− τj)− ln φ
)
ln cj(zj) = lnλj +
1− τj
1+ η
[
ln(1− τj)− ln φ
]
+ (1− τj) ln zj.
uj(zj) = lnλj +
1− τj
1+ η
[
ln
(
1− τj
)− ln φ− 1]+ (1− τj) ln zj
Then the government maximizes
W = (1− δ)∑∞j=0 δjE0(uj)
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where
E0(uj) = lnλj +
1− τj
1+ η
[
ln
(
1− τj
)− 1]− (1− τj)σ2φ2 − (1− τj)jσ2ω2 ,
subject to the resource constraint
P = (1− δ)∑∞j=0 δjE0(rj) = 0
where the periods costs are
E0(rj) = λjb1,φ(τj)
(
1− τj
) 1−τj
1+η Bω(1− τj)j −
(
1− τj
) 1
1+η ,
where b1,φ(τ) = E
(
e−
1−τ
1+η φ
)
= e−
1
2 (1−τ)τσ2φ , and the right-hand side uses E
(
e−
1
1+η φ
)
= 1.
Let ζ be the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint. The first-order conditions in
λj are
1
λj
= ζb1,φ(τj)B(1− τj)j
(
1− τj
) 1−τj
1+η . (23)
The first condition simply requires that average consumption is equalized across periods
and equals ζ−1. Using (23), write the period utility as
E0(uj) = − ln ζ −
1− τj
1+ η
− (1− τj)2
σ2φ
2
− j(1− τj)2σ
2
ω
2
,
and the government’s problem as
W = ln ζˆ − (1− δ)∑∞j=0 δj
[
1− τj
1+ η
+ (1− τj)2
σ2φ
2
+ j(1− τj)2σ
2
ω
2
]
,
where
ζˆ = (1− δ)∑∞j=0 δj
(
1− τj
) 1
1+η .
where ζˆ = 1/ζ.
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The first-order condition in 1− τj is
1
1+ η
+ (1− τj)σ2φ + j(1− τj)σ2ω = ζ
(
1− τj
) 1
1+η
1
1+ η
1
1− τj ,
where the last term comes from simplifying the derivative of the exponential term.
Note that if τ is constant then welfare reduces to the welfare in the history indepen-
dent case. This also shows that the optimal choice of λ only has a second-order effect on
welfare, since the welfare is the same in both cases.
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